Michael C. Burch

What explains the specific location of Islamic State attacks in Syria and Iraq? We consider how both ethnic and economic factors shape the group's decision-making about where to attack. We explore these competing motivations using spatial analysis of the Islamic State's individual acts of violence from 2013-2017. We find that both areas with ethnic heterogeneity and valuable economic rents are associated with more individual Islamic State violent events. By examing the micro-foundations of the Islamic State's conflict decisions, we provide further nuance to understanding the strategic logic of rebel groups during wartime.

Why do some rebel groups fractionalize during intrastate conflict? The focus of this article is on understanding a particular phenomenon within fragmentation during civil war: the emergence of viable splinter factions. Splinter factions are when a new rebel group emerges from an ongoing violent challenge against the state and concurrently launches their own violent campaign rather than continue to pool resources to mount a more effective fight. In this article, we outline how the organizational characteristics of the original rebel movement can create several conditions in which splinter factions will emerge. Organizational decisions regarding, mobilization, central command, and territorial control creates opportunities for aggrieved members within the coalition to strike out on their own. Support for the theory is found through statistical tests on the internal characteristics of rebel groups demonstrating the importance of rebel group structure in understanding contemporary conflict processes.

How may the legitimacy of rebel groups shape the decisions of third-party states to support insurgencies militarily? In aiming to better understand how the (group-level) attributes of insurgencies motivate interventions on their behalf, we argue that the size of rebel forces serves as a proxy for a revolution's perceived legitimacy within the international community. Specifically, we maintain that the larger the insurgency, the greater the insurgency's perceived legitimacy and, thus, the more likely intervention on its behalf becomes. This analysis challenges previous studies that have confined the causal salience of faction size to relative capabilities or strength, and it also underscores the controversial policy implications of this finding.

How do rebel groups determine their targets during intrastate conflict? We build upon two competing theories in conflict studies that emphasize either the social or economic determinants of violence during war and use geographic information systems (GIS) analysis to explore these competing theories. To do this, we utilize a subnational analysis of the most likely case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to understand whether ethnicity or natural resources motivates the location of conflict events. Accounting for geography, we find that economic endowments in the form of natural resources are highly related with the number of violent attacks, while the presence of competing ethnic groups does not offer much help in understanding the location of conflict events.