Anthony R. Brunello

One of the means to undermine democratic government is to destroy public trust in institutions. Tyrants break confidence in democracy by constantly attacking government as wasteful, incompetent, and illegitimate. The conservative movement in America gradually moved in this direction on three fronts: religion, economics, and democratic institutions, working toward minority autocracy and against egalitarianism and diversity. Reagan-era neoliberalism evolved into the Tea Party Movement (in 2008) and has now transformed into MAGA (in 2016) (Make America Great Again) under Donald Trump. The Heritage Foundation is now ready to fulfill a dream of “dismantling the administrative state” with Project 2025: Mandate for Leadership (in 2023). This extended commentary chronicles the means through which the American conservative movement used racism and religion to undermine democratic institutions for the sake of power and wealth and to win an ideological culture war for White nationalism.

The United States is enduring an identity crisis characterized by a polarized political climate precipitating an American culture war. In this battle the Republican Party has been overtaken by “Anti-wokeism” allied with antidemocratic “states' rights” beliefs claiming an exclusive, antipluralist definition of republic. The extremist right in America insists that America is not a democracy, but a “republic” built to respect the status of a minority characterized as white, nationalist and Christian. “Anti-wokeism” is an extension of Trumpism and MAGA (Make America Great Again), gathering together antidemocratic forces, fueled by resentment and theories of racial displacement known as the Great Replacement Theory. These forces are overwhelming the modern Republican Party, inspiring homophobia, misogyny, racism, book bans, and violence. This essay addresses the following four elements of this crisis with an eye to a renewed vision of America: (1) the difference between an 18th Century and 21st Century definition of a republic; (2) the antidemocratic states' rights movement; (3) the nature of strongman populism in American politics; and (4) a vision of diversity as the core principle of the American Republic.

American political conservatism is distinct from its counterparts in Europe and elsewhere in the world. American conservatives have long staked their claims on devotion to limited government and free-markets, but also on an image of responsibility. Conservatives posed as the “adult in the room,” admonishing the young, the anti-war types, social progressives, ultra-liberals, environmentalists, and socialists for their radicalism and immaturity. Conservatives defended tradition, rules, hierarchy, and social conventions. Today the roles are switching. Conservatives have morphed into a new political space, while many of their more progressive opponents call for rule of law and American institutions of democracy. Conservatives find themselves the problem rather than the solution, displaying a shortsighted and toxic immaturity destructive of democratic institutions. This article explores the transformation with a focus on developments occurring in the 21st century—in America and around the world.

The rise of populist leaders like Trump certainly raises issues of leadership and effectiveness. The current populist moment may be one of “Cultural Backlash,” but there is also merit in resurrecting and assessing the work of Niccolò Machiavelli in evaluating Trump’s leadership and success. Would Machiavelli, with his emphasis on a “success ethic” and a studied moral indifference, rate Trump to be a “great prince?” This article analyzes Machiavelli’s role and contemporary relevance as well as what he might say about a leader like Donald Trump. Machiavelli offers one insight into a style of leader that exposes the dangers of ignorance allied with self-interest in a nationalist pose. Also, we can visualize (with Machiavelli’s help) a modern reconsideration of the dimensions of love, hate, and fear in 21st century leadership—especially among national populist leaders. This matters politically to us all.

The U.S. Federal Constitution was built to be a machine for displacing conflict. Madison and the other Framers erected a Federal Republic organized to control populist movements and preserve the interests of the greatest stakeholders, while offering the "most liberty imaginable" in 1788. In 2016, a populist movement ascended to the commanding heights of power. How did it happen and what are the consequences when a faction comes to power? Is it a defect of the modern structure of American government? Has the U.S. Constitution reached a place where it is no longer functional? Or can Madison's Republic continue to work against popular factions rising in a common passion fired by fear and hatred? In tackling these questions, this article suggests that the U.S. Constitutional Framers did not know in 1788 what exiting the aristocratic and feudal world would mean and what kind of state and society the Republic would become. I argue Madison's contributions to The Federalist are exemplars of the engineer showing how each part of the machine fits together to achieve a comprehensive and effective whole. The national populism of the kind circulating around the Western world in 2016 has posed real challenges to that machinery. Keywords: Populism, Political Theory, U.S. Constitution, Liberalism, Liberty, Constitutional Ideals, Democracy, United States, Madison, Founding Fathers, Framers, Federal Republic. Los creadores de la Constitucion de los EE. UU. no sabian en 1788 ni lo que significaria el fin del mundo aristocratico y feudal, ni en que tipo de sociedad y estado se convertiria la Republica. Habia en este acto de creacion una oferta milagrosa de los fundamentos de un ideal democratico y constitucional que fluye con los valores del liberalismo, el pluralismo, la libertad y la igualdad, igualmente fundamentados en la misma Ilustracion. La constitucion federal fue creada para ser una maquina que descarta el conflicto. Madison y los otros creadores fundaron una republica federal para controlar los movimientos populistas y preservar los intereses de los afectados mas importantes, y al mismo tiempo ofrecer "la mayor libertad imaginable" en 1788. Palabras clave: populismo, teoria politica, Constitucion de EE. UU., nacionalismo, populismo, liberalismo, libertad, ideales constitucionales, democracia, Madison, padres fundadores, disenadores, republica federal. [phrase omitted] [phrase omitted]

This article is part of an ongoing project of the authors to systematically compare the policy-making influence of courts in nations with disparate political systems, levels of economic development, and legal traditions. Presented herein is a two-nation comparative case study of the policy influence of the highest courts in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of India. The general research strategy begins with the premise that judicial decisions are not self-executing and therefore implementation requires the cooperation of others. Courts are forced to rely on other political actors to translate policy decisions into action. From this premise the authors reason that the degree of judicial influence in the policy process of any nation can be roughly gauged by examining the reaction of other actors who, as part of the political environment, are themselves subject to a wide range of political pressures. Using the judicial impact model of Charles A. Johnson, the authors analyze the impact of the courts on university admission policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the industrial disputes machinery in the Republic of India.